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Small Business and the 
Minimum Wage
Oren M. Levin-Waldman and George W. McCarthy
Do small businesses change their hiring and employment practices in response to an
increase in the minimum wage? The Levy Institute conducts a national survey of small
firms in many industries to find out.
It has long been the conventional wisdom that an increase in the minimum wage results in lower employment.
This wisdom stems from both theoretical precepts taught in most economic textbooks and statements from
employers regarding their anticipated reaction to an increase. It is also suggested that much of the opposition to
the minimum wage comes from the small business community. Arguments against raising the minimum wage
presume that an increase reduces profits for small businesses and forces them to lay workers off. There is little
empirical evidence measuring the actual responses of small businesses to changes in the minimum wage. What
is available is anecdotal evidence, the results of a few studies by academics on the effects of the minimum wage
on the teen labor market, and the predictions of the minimum wage study commission that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage might result in a 1 percent reduction in teen employment (Kosters and Welch
1972; Welch 1974, 1978; Meyer and Wise 1983; Neumark and Wascher 1992).
Most of the studies on the teen labor market were conducted during the 1970s and early 1980s. What has been
done recently, most notably the work of Card and Krueger (summarized in Card and Krueger 1995), has been
controversial, not simply because critics argue that the conclusions are wrong, but because the findings
represent an affront to the orthodoxy of the economics profession and a threat to those with a vested interest in
resisting minimum wage increases. According to Card and Krueger (1995), when California and New Jersey
both increased their minimum wages, there were no adverse effects on employment. These findings were
confirmed for New Jersey and Pennsylvania (Card and Krueger 1998). 
Implicit in all the theoretical or empirical work regarding the minimum wage is the assumption that the
minimum wage is set above the competitive market clearing level; that is, the wage is high enough so that labor
demand dictates the number of people hired. Little is known about the relative sensitivity of firms' labor
demand to changes in wages, a concept known as "wage elasticity of demand." In the minimum wage
commission study mentioned above, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage resulted in a 1 percent
reduction in employment (a wage elasticity of 0.1). In the work that follows, we suggest that in a range of
wages around the current minimum wage this estimate of wage elasticity is too high. In other words, small
business employers are extremely insensitive to changes in the minimum wage.
Most empirical research on the minimum wage focuses on a specific group of employees (teenage workers) or
a specific industry (the fast-food industry). In this policy note, we present some early findings from more
comprehensive data obtained through a survey of small businesses conducted at the Levy Institute. The data
provide useful information on the hiring and employment practices of small businesses. Our analysis suggests
that a large majority of small businesses were not affected by the recent minimum wage hike. Further, there is
strong evidence that were the minimum wage to be increased from its current $5.15 per hour to $6.00 per hour,
the hiring practices of most small businesses still would not be affected. These findings add to the considerable
body of empirical research on the minimum wage that contradicts the theoretical presuppositions that have
driven minimum wage policy thus far. 
The SurveyThe purpose of the survey was to obtain information about the hiring practices of small businesses as they
relate to questions concerning the recent reform of the welfare system and increases in the minimum wage.1
Over the course of three weeks during the winter of 1998, a nationally representative, stratified random sample
of 568 small businesses (businesses with no more than 1,000 employees) across industry types were contacted
by telephone and asked a series of questions. Three basic questions were related to minimum wage issues: (1)
Would an increase in the minimum wage alter your decision to hire former welfare recipients? (2) Did the
recent increase in the minimum wage affect your hiring or employment decisions? (3) If the minimum wage
were raised to $6.00 per hour, would it affect your overall hiring or employment decisions? Table 1 shows the
responses to the three questions.
Few businesses (9.9 percent) felt that changing the minimum wage would affect their willingness to hire former
welfare recipients. This is good news for those looking to the small business sector to absorb former welfare
recipients and suggests that small businesses may not align against proponents of a so-called living wage for
former welfare recipients. 
An even smaller proportion of small businesses (6.2 percent) felt that the recent hike in the minimum wage had
affected their overall hiring and employment practices. Although the percentage of businesses that expected
that their decisions would be affected by an increase to a $6.00 minimum is quite a bit larger (20.7 percent), as
we will see, few of them thought they would reduce employment. Common economic wisdom suggests that
increases in the minimum wage will force employers to lay workers off. However, there is a fundamental
difference between laying off current employees and hiring fewer additional workers. If the latter effect
dominates, job creation might be hindered, but jobs will not necessarily decrease (see Brown, Hamilton, and
Medoff 1990).
We asked employers who said they were affected by the recent hike in the minimum wage to specify the
effects. Most of these firms hired fewer additional workers. Of the 6.2 percent of employers who said their
decisions were affected by the recent increase, 17.1 percent indicated that they hired fewer workers and 5.7
percent indicated that they laid workers off. The fact that about one-third of 1 percent of small businesses
reduced their employment suggests that small businesses' demand for labor is extremely inelastic, at least at a
wage around $5.15 per hour. Similarly, of the 20.7 percent of employers who said that they would be affected
by an increase in the minimum wage to $6.00 per hour, 29.3 percent said they would hire fewer workers and
11.2 percent said they would lay workers off. The remainder thought that they would reduce benefits, show
smaller profits, or pay the higher wage. In other words, fewer than 3 percent of small businesses would reduce
employment if the minimum rose to $6.00 per hour, which again suggests that small businesses have an
inelastic demand for labor in this wage range.
To illustrate the degree of inelasticity, consider the 0.1 elasticity of labor demand estimated in the commission
study cited above. For this wage elasticity to hold, the affected businesses would have to lay off about
two-thirds of their minimum-wage employees following an increase in the minimum wage to $6.00 per hour.
There is no evidence in our survey or other studies that small businesses have done so following past minimum
wage increases. Such high figures appear so implausible that they call into question the credibility of such
elasticity estimates, at least as they apply to small businesses.
The wage elasticity of demand for labor can increase with the wage, so that even if recent minimum wage
increases did not have the expected textbook disemployment effects, a larger increase could induce such
effects. Is there a point at which the minimum wage begins to "bite" into employment? This is an extemelyimportant policy question because it allows one to weigh the employment costs of different minimum wage
increases against the benefits of raising the wage. We begin to address this question by looking more carefully
at the types of small businesses most affected by the recent minimum wage increase and our hypothetical
increase.
The industries most affected by minimum wage increases are unsurprising (see Table 2). For example, the retail
sales and trade and the food service industries have the highest proportion of firms whose hiring and
employment practices were affected by the recent increase (question 2). In response to our hypothetical
increase from $5.15 to $6.00 per hour (question 3), the retail sales and trade, services, and food service
industries dominate the statistics, with the proportion of firms that would be affected more than doubling in
these industries. This suggests that in these industries disemployment effects might become evident with
another increase in the minimum wage.
The low percentages of affected firms in the blue-collar and public sector industries might be explained by the
fact that those firms pay an entry-level wage above the minimum. Respondents were polled on their typical
entry wage. As shown in Table 3, 87.1 percent of those firms with an entry-level wage at or near the minimum
(between $5.15 and $6.00 per hour) were not affected in their hiring or employment practices by the last
increase in the minimum wage (question 2). More than half of these small businesses thought they would still
not be affected by an increase to $6.00 per hour (question 3), although the proportion of those that would be
affected more than triples from 10.0 percent to 37.6 percent. 
Of the sample, 37.1 percent paid minimum entry wages. Of those that were affected by increasing the minimum
wage to $5.15 per hour (question 2), 60 percent paid a minimum entry wage. A much smaller proportion of
businesses that paid entry wages above the minimum, 31.4 percent (or about half the proportion of those that
paid the minimum entry wage), were affected by the last increase in the minimum wage. For the hypothetical
increase to $6.00 per hour (question 3), the proportion of affected businesses increases slightly, to 68.1 percent,
for those paying a minimum entry wage while it declines slightly for those paying above the minimum. 
Although there is some relationship between entry wages and sensitivity to minimum wage changes, the
relationship is weak. One in ten businesses paying minimum entry wages was affected by the latest increase.
Only about one in three thinks it will be affected by a further increase. Yet the majority of businesses that were
affected by minimum wage increases paid minimum entry wages. Identifying those who bear the cost of
minimum wage increases is another important concern for policymakers. 
Conclusions
A principal problem in the debate about the minimum wage has been the absence of good data and adequatemeasures. The findings of this survey serve to put the conventional wisdom of the economic mainstream into
context. Doubt is cast on the notion that minimum wage increases lead to significant adverse employment
effects. As we have noted, if the predicted 1 percent decrease in employment were to accompany a 10 percent
minimum wage increase, affected businesses would have to lay off two-thirds of their minimum-wage
employees. To the contrary, the hiring practices of most small businesses would not be affected at all.
The proportion of small businesses that said their decisions would not be affected diminished somewhat when
they were asked about a hypothetical further increase to $6.00 per hour. This suggests that there might be
limits to how high the minimum wage could be increased before larger effects on the demand for labor occur.
Our findings suggest that the minimum wage can be raised to $6.00 per hour before significant disemployment
effects from small business become evident. 
Finally, we looked more carefully at which small businesses would be affected by minimum wage increases.
Not surprisingly, the retail sales and trade, service, and food service industries were the most sensitive to wage
increases. Perhaps more surprising, a small proportion of businesses that paid minimum entry wages were
affected by the recent minimum wage hike. A larger, but still small proportion of those paying minimum entry
wages expected to be affected by the hypothetical increase to $6.00 per hour. 
Public Policy 
These findings have several implications for public policy regarding the trade-off between the negative
employment effects of raising the minimum wage and the benefits of raising the wage. There are also
implications regarding the mechanism by which changes in the wage should be made.
The findings of our survey suggest that the minimum wage could be raised somewhat without producing the
predicted adverse unemployment effects. We can identify those who would likely bear a disproportionate cost
of a hike in the minimum wage (as noted above, the retail sales and trade, services, and food service industries
are most sensitive to wage increases); public policy might aim to relieve some of this burden, if possible.
The justification for raising the minimum wage until it "bites" is that the benefits that accrue to society through
wage increases--most notably, the benefits of raising the income of the working poor and of making work more
viable for those who will be forced by the 1996 welfare reform to go from welfare to work--would likely
outweigh the costs. In our opinion, to create jobs that do not enable families to live above the poverty level
simply for the sake of creating jobs has no public policy value. If most of the affected businesses are going to
respond to a hike by not hiring additional workers rather than by laying off their present workers, then the
minimum should be increased because the jobs that might have been created in the absence of the increase are
not jobs we as a society would like to see created. 
Chart 1 shows the relationship between the poverty level for a family of three with at least one child and the
yearly earnings of a full-time worker earning the minimum wage for the years 1959 through 1997. The annual
income associated with a full-time job at the legislated minimum wage tracked the poverty level fairly closely
from 1959 until the early 1980s. The inflations of the late 1970s and 1980s pushed the poverty level up, but the
legislated minimum wage income remained constant until the 1990s. Currently, a minimum-wage worker earns
considerably less than the poverty level for a family of three with at least one child (the minimum level for a
household to qualify for public assistance benefits). This is the well-documented erosion of the value of
minimum wage earnings which, as the chart shows, was barely addressed by legislated increases during the
1990s. The ratio of yearly earnings at a minimum wage to the poverty level is shown in Chart 2. The ratio reaches its
nadir in 1989, when the yearly income for a full-time minimum-wage worker was 70 percent of the poverty
level. In 1997 the income of this worker was around 83 percent of the poverty level. Considering that people
leaving the welfare rolls have children and are likely to have few skills, a minimum-wage job is a fairly dim
prospect for them. In order to elevate the annual income of a full-time worker earning the minimum wage to the
poverty level, the minimum wage would need to be raised to $6.15 per hour. We showed above that
employers' sensitivity to minimum wage increases in the $6.00 per hour range is low, so we can assume that
few disemployment effects (at least among small businesses) will be associated with an increase to $6.00 per
hour.
Another policy consideration is the mechanism by which changes in the minimum wage should be made.
Should the wage continue to be legislated on an ad hoc basis? As one can see from the charts, the minimum
wage income tracked the poverty level quite poorly in the 1980s and 1990s. We need to ask ourselves why we
have a minimum wage in the first place. If it is designed to provide a minimum living wage, then a way should
be found to keep the income it provides at such a level. In order to do this, minimum wage policy must be
depoliticized, that is, it must be removed from the political arena of recurring debate, delay, and compromise
each time an increase is contemplated. A way to do this is to adopt a policy of indexation.
Although indexation of transfer payments, like Social Security, has been hotly debated recently, the debate has
centered on the appropriate index to use, not on the appropriateness of indexation itself. The logic of
indexation is sound. People supporting themselves on fixed incomes need protection from market vagaries. As
a society, we do not countenance driving the aged or infirm from their homes because of a general price
increase. However, at the same time we have allowed the purchasing power of the minimum wage to erode
considerably for long periods between revisions. Indexing the minimum wage, as we do transfer payments, is a
simple and desirable solution to this problem.The annual income from an example of an indexed minimum wage is presented in Chart 1. We calculated a
minimum wage that increases proportionally with the median hourly wage starting in 1979 (the year in which
the legislated minimum wage departed from the poverty level). The median wage was chosen as the
appropriate index because it represents market-induced changes in wages reflecting changes in both
productivity and prices. As one can see, the indexed wage tracks the poverty level quite closely, slightly
exceeding it. If the minimum wage had been indexed in this fashion starting in 1979, the 1997 wage would
have been $6.50 per hour.
When we raise the minimum wage 10 or 20 percent at once in a legislated change, disemployment effects
become pronounced because employers have no time to adjust to the sizable wage change. Large jumps in the
minimum wage are likely to inflict greater difficulties on small businesses than small, incremental changes. An
indexed minimum wage would keep changes relatively small, eliminating large dislocations and minimizing
the negative effect of increases on employers. Once the minimum wage is set at an adequate level, indexation
would ensure that increases thereafter will be automatic and incremental and that the minimum wage will retain
its purchasing power. 
Note
1. The relevance of responses to issues of welfare reform will be discussed in detail in a separate policy note. 
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